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A HOPEFUL RETIREMENT FROM PRISON: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S
EVOLVING DEFINITION OF A “MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO
OBTAIN RELEASE FROM PRISON” OFFERS CORRIGIBLE JUVENILE
OFFENDERS A SECOND CHANCE IN UNITED STATES v. GRANT
MACKENZIE E. BRENNAN*
“Mercy without justice is the mother of all dissolution;
justice without mercy is cruelty.”1
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO MAKING HOPE MEANINGFUL AGAIN
IN JUVENILE SENTENCING
Giving a child a second chance is the right thing to do.2  In 2013,
Sharon Wiggins, the longest-serving-female inmate in the state of Penn-
sylvania, died in prison at the age of sixty-two—she was sentenced as a
juvenile to life in prison without the opportunity for parole (LWOP).3  As
a child, Ms. Wiggins faced persistent poverty, neglect, and abuse—a seem-
ingly forgotten youth.4  Despite her unfortunate upbringing, the sentenc-
ing judge had no choice but to sentence Ms. Wiggins to an unforgiving
LWOP sentence.5  Nevertheless, while in prison, Ms. Wiggins rose above
her circumstances—she earned a college degree, became a model mentor,
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B.A., 2015, Villanova University.  This Note is dedicated to my parents, Daniel and
Maryann, as well as my brother Nicholas, who give me unbounded love and
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Note.
1. See Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 701 (Md. 2018) (citing Randy Lee, Justice
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo and His Two Most Important Questions: Reflections on the
Choice of Tycho Brahe, 34 TOURO L. REV. 237, 242 (2018)) (quoting Saint Thomas
Aquinas) (disqualifying de facto LWOP sentences and LWOP sentences by name
for juvenile offenders on the basis of their merciless nature).
2. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010) (asserting that while states are
not required to guarantee eventual freedom and release for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders, states must impose sentences that provide “meaningful opportunity for
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”).
3. See Dana DiFilippo, In Memory of Sharon Wiggins, a Child 45 Years Ago Sen-
tenced to Die in Prison, JUVENILE LAW CTR. (Mar. 25, 2013), https://jlc.org/news/
memory-sharon-wiggins-child-45-years-ago-sentenced-die-prison [https://perma
.cc/V3UE-8BG3] (discussing life and death of Sharon Wiggins, the longest-serving-
female prisoner in Pennsylvania prison system).
4. See id. (discussing Wiggins’s childhood and treatment in justice system).
5. See id. (declaring that although Miller v. Alabama declared mandatory juve-
nile LWOP sentences unconstitutional, Wiggins was one of approximately 500 ju-
venile lifers in Pennsylvania state prison awaiting her opportunity to demonstrate
rehabilitation to parole board).
(599)
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and tutored her fellow inmates.6  Despite her achievements, however, the
criminal justice system never afforded Ms. Wiggins the opportunity to
demonstrate to either a judge or parole board that she was no longer the
same troubled adolescent who committed a terrible crime over four de-
cades prior.7  Although Ms. Wiggins will never personally benefit from the
promising evolution in juvenile sentencing, her legacy should not endure
in vain.8
Regrettably, the United States stands alone as the sole country that
sentences juveniles, like Ms. Wiggins, to LWOP for crimes they committed
before turning eighteen.9  Though this state of affairs is relatively bleak,
the United States Supreme Court has rapidly amended the juvenile sen-
tencing landscape to offer juvenile offenders increased leniency and
hope.10  Since the early 2000s, the Court not only banned the death pen-
alty for all juvenile offenders, but also categorically banned mandatory
LWOP sentences for all corrigible (i.e., rehabilitated) juveniles due to
LWOP’s inherent similarity to capital punishment.11  Hence, for more
than a decade, the Court has taken steps to protect juveniles from the
harshest criminal punishments, particularly LWOP.12
Despite the Court’s progressive shift away from juvenile LWOP
sentences, some state and federal courts insist on sentencing juveniles to
6. See id. (describing Wiggins’s rehabilitation while incarcerated, stating that
she earned a college degree and over 10,000 educational certificates, tutored fel-
low inmates in math, helped peers earn GEDs, and spoke out when young female
inmates were allegedly raped by prison guards).
7. See id. (stating Wiggins never had the opportunity to demonstrate
rehabilitation).
8. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (asserting that given
holdings of Roper and Graham, and childrens’ diminished culpability and capacity
for rehabilitation, courts should rarely sentence juveniles to LWOP).
9. See Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juve-
nile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/9RQF-95A2] (providing national sta-
tistics for juvenile LWOP sentencing practices in United States).
10. See id. (discussing importance of retroactivity of Miller in that states can
remedy unconstitutionality of mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences by conducting
parole hearings and  evaluating corrigibility rather than resentence approximately
2,100 people who received mandatory life sentences). But see Louisiana Denies Pa-
role to 78-Year-Old Henry Montgomery, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/7186/ [https://perma.cc/2ATL-PDVE]
(condemning Louisiana Committee on Parole’s decision to deny parole to Henry
Montgomery, the petitioner in Montgomery v. Louisiana).
11. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (asserting that
because Miller announced new rule of substantive law, courts must give this hold-
ing retroactive effect); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (declaring juvenile mandatory
LWOP sentences inherently violate Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unu-
sual punishment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–72 (2010) (concluding juve-
nile sentences of LWOP for nonhomicide offenders violate Eighth Amendment);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (holding death penalty violates
Eighth Amendment for offenders under age eighteen).
12. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (discussing why sentencing judges must
treat juvenile offenders with greater leniency).
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these severe punishments.13  Of particular concern, state and federal
courts inconsistently interpret whether the Supreme Court’s seminal juve-
nile sentencing cases, Graham v. Florida14 and Miller v. Alabama,15 unequiv-
ocally ban lengthy juvenile term-of-years sentences that, similar to LWOP
sentences, prevent rehabilitated juvenile offenders from obtaining release
from prison.16  For example, some state and federal courts continue to
impose extensive juvenile term-of-year sentences that either exceed
the juvenile’s life expectancy or deny the juvenile parole until a severe-
ly advanced age.17  Such lengthy term-of-years sentences are synony-
13. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 123 (sustaining that although sentencing courts
must provide juveniles with sentences that afford them “a meaningful opportunity
to obtain release,” this still leaves many unanswered questions: what does “mean-
ingful” mean and when must it occur?). Compare People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d
291, 291–92 (Cal. 2012) (holding that sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offender
to term-of-years sentence with parole eligibility date falling outside offender’s natu-
ral life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and further main-
taining that Miller made clear that Graham’s flat ban on LWOP sentences applies to
all nonhomicide cases involving juvenile offenders, including term-of-years
sentences), and State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 63 (Iowa 2013) (reasoning that pa-
role eligibility date falling within man’s late sixties does not comport with Graham’s
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation), with United
States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that 600-month
sentence does not fall within Miller’s categorical ban on mandatory LWOP
sentences because Court in Miller did not hold that Eighth Amendment categori-
cally prohibits imposing sentence of LWOP on juvenile offender), and Lucero v.
People, 394 P.3d 1128, 1130 (Colo. 2017) (asserting that neither Graham nor Miller
apply to aggregate term-of-years sentence because LWOP is a specific type of sen-
tence distinct from term-of-years sentences).
14. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75 (announcing sentencing courts may not
impose LWOP sentences on persons under age eighteen who are convicted of
nonhomicide crimes because that is where society draws line between childhood
and adulthood).
15. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 470–75 (indicating how holdings from Roper and
Graham imply that mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences are unconstitutional).
16. See generally Rebecca Lowry, The Constitutionality of Lengthy Term-of-Years
Sentences for Juvenile Non-Homicide Offenders, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 881, 883 (2014)
(positing that justifications for prohibiting LWOP do not simply disappear because
sentence is not technically LWOP by name—de facto life sentence).
17. See Davis v. McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317, 1321 (10th Cir. 2015) (announcing
that because Miller addressed only mandatory LWOP sentences, relief may not be
granted for sentence imposed under non-mandatory LWOP scheme); see also Croft
v. Williams, 773 F.3d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 2014) (asserting that Miller is inapplicable
to Croft’s case because Miller only considered mandatory LWOP sentences); Laura
Cohen, Nicholas Kiriakatos & Patrick Kouyialis, Making Miller Matter: Youth, Parole,
and a Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 33 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2018, at 34, 35
(contending that some state parole boards have resisted Miller’s mandate requiring
individualized sentencing hearings considering diminished culpability and imma-
turity, which makes parole as illusory as ever); cf. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547
(6th Cir. 2012) (stating that defendant is not entitled to habeas relief because
Graham does not clearly establish that consecutive, fixed-term sentences for
juveniles who have committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional
when they amount to de facto life sentence); State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 384
(Ariz. 2006) (en banc) (commenting that sentence is not unconstitutional simply
3
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mous with de facto LWOP sentences—this is a distinction without a
difference.18
While some states maintain that Graham and Miller broadly prohibit
any sentence that effectively denies a corrigible juvenile parole within
their lifetime, other states contend that Graham and Miller only specifically
proscribe LWOP sentences by name for corrigible juveniles.19  Although
Graham grants each respective state the autonomy to choose how to afford
corrigible juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release
from prison, there is a dire possibility that some states infringe upon Gra-
ham and Miller’s fundamental promise of providing rehabilitated juvenile
offenders a realistic chance at release from prison.20  Until the Supreme
Court explicitly holds that corrigible juvenile term-of-years sentences that
exceed the juvenile’s life expectancy violate the Eighth Amendment, it ap-
pears such sentences may remain constitutionally permissible.21
Evidently, the constitutionality of corrigible juvenile de facto life
sentences appears far from settled.22  Given that most states have not yet
because it is made up of several sentences that are lengthy in aggregate, even if
defendant faces total sentence exceeding normal life expectancy).
18. See Mark T. Freeman, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the
Reality of De Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961, 968 (2013) [hereinaf-
ter Freeman, Meaningless Opportunities] (citing Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life
Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Ratchet, 35 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 425 n.91 (2011)) (asserting that although Graham’s holding
is “quite narrow—it only applies to actual LWOP sentences for juveniles who com-
mit nonhomicide offenses,” in actuality Graham’s holding may also apply to de
facto LWOP sentences).
19. See Freeman, Meaningless Opportunities, supra note 18, at 963 (arguing
LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicde offenses fundamentally
violate the Eighth Amendment).  A LWOP sentence by name is a sentence that the
court explicitly labels as LWOP, whereas a de facto LWOP sentence is a term-of-
years sentence that is the “functional equivalent of a life without parole term” and
effectively denies a juvenile parole within their lifetime.  For a further discussion of
whether Graham and Miller apply specifically to LWOP by name or de facto juvenile
life sentences generally, see infra notes 72–81 and accompanying text.
20. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 76 (asserting that although states ultimately
choose how they will comply with affording juveniles “meaningful opportunity for
release,” states are not required to release juveniles from prison if they are incorri-
gible). See generally Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State
Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 375–76 (2014) (discuss-
ing the three elements that comprise Graham’s “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release”); id. at 383–88 (examining that while Iowa Supreme Court held a fifty-two-
and-a-half-year sentence without possibility of parole unconstitutional under Gra-
ham and Miller, Arkansas and Missouri courts have upheld similar term-of-years
sentences as constitutional under Eighth Amendment).
21. For a discussion of states that held that lengthy term-of-years sentences do
not fall within the protections of Graham and Miller, see infra notes 78–79 and
accompanying text.
22. Compare Goins v. Smith, 556 F. App’x 434, 438–39 (6th Cir. 2014) (empha-
sizing that because Graham did not clearly establish that consecutive, fixed term-of-
years sentences were unconstitutional, sentences amounting to practical equivalent
of life are constitutional especially when juvenile can apply for parole after forty-
five years), with State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 212 (N.J. 2017) (opining that empha-
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addressed the issue of these sentences, this ambiguity demands the Su-
preme Court provide states with clarity to ensure corrigible juvenile of-
fenders receive a genuine chance to attain a meaningful life outside of
prison.23  Without any further guidance from the Court as to what a mean-
ingful opportunity for release actually entails, the rights of thousands of
imprisoned rehabilitated juvenile offenders remain vulnerable.24
In the meantime, the Third Circuit has taken a promising step in
United States v. Grant25 towards protecting corrigible juvenile offenders
from LWOP sentences, de facto or otherwise.26  In Grant, the Third Cir-
cuit utilized a rebuttable presumption that all corrigible juvenile offenders
must receive an opportunity for parole before they reach the national age
of retirement.27  While the holding in Grant may generate hope, it never-
theless may also continue to leave sentencing judges with too much discre-
tion to incarcerate corrigible juveniles for unduly long term-of-years
sis of juvenile’s aggregate term-of-years sentence should be on practical conse-
quences, and thus Miller’s holding broadly applies to lengthy term-of-years
sentences that exceed juvenile’s lifetime and sentences that amount to practical
equivalent of life sentence, regardless of whether juvenile committed multiple or
single offense).
23. See generally Starks v. Easterling, 659 F. App’x 277, 280 (6th Cir. 2016)
(stating that although Court may one day hold fixed-term-of-years sentences for
juvenile offenders are functional equivalent of life-without-parole, this court
should not predict future outcomes, and because Court has not yet explicitly held
that Eighth Amendment extends to juvenile sentences that are functional
equivalent of de facto life sentences, Tennessee’s judgment was not unreasonable
application of clearly established law); cf. People v. Nun˜ez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616,
624 (Cal. 2011) (“Finding a determinate sentence exceeding a juvenile’s life ex-
pectancy constitutional because it is not labeled an LWOP sentence is Orwellian.
Simply put, a distinction based on changing a label, as the trial court did, is arbi-
trary and baseless.”).
24. See People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 454 (Cal. 2018) (stating that al-
though “meaningful opportunity for release” is not precisely defined, “Graham
spoke of the chance to rejoin society in qualitative terms,” and thus Court implied
more than compassionate physical release from prison shortly before death (quot-
ing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010))). But see Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.
Ct. 1726, 1727 (2017) (holding that Graham left it to respective states to explore
ways to comply with its rule, and therefore Virginia’s geriatric release program
satisfies Graham’s requirement of affording juvenile offenders with meaningful op-
portunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation).
25. 887 F.3d 131, 152 (3d Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 905 F.3d
285 (3d Cir. 2018) (case listed for rehearing en banc Feb. 20, 2019) (commenting
that Third Circuit is adopting only rebuttable presumption and not bright line
rule).  Despite the Third Circuit vacating the Grant opinion, the court’s discussion
in the case and this Note remain of interest in that both highlight the severe incon-
sistencies in juvenile LWOP sentencing, and such discrepancies are ripe for review
by the United States Supreme Court.
26. See id. at 142 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016))
(declaring that Eighth Amendment “prohibits term-of-years sentences for the en-
tire duration of a juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy when the defen-
dant’s ‘crimes reflect transient immaturity [and not] . . . irreparable corruption’”).
27. See id. at 153 (holding that sentencing judges should presumptively sen-
tence juvenile offenders below national age of retirement unless other sentencing
factors strongly instruct against doing so).
5
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sentences.28  Rather than establishing a rebuttable presumption, the
Third Circuit ought to take a more promising step and grant all corrigible
juvenile offenders automatic parole eligibility at the national age of retire-
ment or earlier to ensure that these offenders have a genuine opportunity
to achieve a meaningful life outside of prison.29
This Note analyzes the Court’s connotation of a “meaningful opportu-
nity to obtain release” and concludes that this standard inherently pros-
cribes unduly long term-of-years sentences amounting to de facto LWOP
for corrigible juvenile offenders.30  To help dissect the Court’s phrasing,
Part II of this Note explores the history of juvenile sentencing and its
evolution within the American justice system.31  Part II also surveys differ-
ent approaches to defining Graham’s meaningful opportunity for release,
while discussing how these differing approaches may violate juvenile of-
fenders’ Eighth Amendment rights.32
Among these approaches is the Third Circuit’s recent case of United
States v. Grant.33  Part III of this Note reviews the facts of Grant, while Part
IV scrutinizes the Third Circuit’s rationale in adopting its novel rebuttable
presumption.34  Finally, Part V reflects on Grant’s impact and potential
shortcomings.35  Ultimately, this Note demonstrates that Ms. Wiggins’s
fate is the exception that proves the rule: LWOP deprives corrigible
juveniles of a life with hope, and no child should ever be deprived of
hope.36
28. See id. at 151 (adopting rebuttable presumption that juvenile offenders
should receive sentence below national age of retirement). See generally Kellee
Spooner & Michael S. Vaughn, Sentencing Juvenile Homicide Offenders: A 50-State Sur-
vey, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 130, 163 (2017) (advocating for elimination of LWOP for
juvenile offenders and eviscerating sentencing option because courts are left with
too much discretion).
29. See generally Stephanie Singer, A Proposed Solution to the Resentencing of Juve-
nile Lifers in Pennsylvania Post Montgomery, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 695, 719 (2018)
(discussing automatic parole eligibility as possible solution to injustices inherent in
juvenile justice system).
30. For a further discussion of how states and circuits apply divergent inter-
pretations of a “meaningful opportunity for release,” see infra notes 72–81 and
accompanying text.
31. For a further discussion of the evolution of the juvenile justice system
within the American legal system, see infra notes 37–60 and accompanying text.
32. For a further discussion of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment analysis, see infra notes 61–71 and accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis in Grant, see infra
notes 96–136 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s line of reasoning and analysis in
Grant, see infra notes 96–136 and accompanying text.
35. For a complete critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s decision and a fur-
ther discussion of the impact of Grant, see infra notes 137–62 and accompanying
text.
36. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (rationalizing, in its move
toward leniency in juvenile sentencing, that when children are denied hope, they
will likely not improve their moral character because doing so would be futile
(quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989))). See generally Brooke
6
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II. A HISTORY OF JUVENILE SENTENCING PRACTICES
The twenty-first century unleashed a period of hope and reform in
juvenile sentencing, beginning with Roper v. Simmons,37 which banned the
death penalty for all juvenile offenders.38  Following this historic holding,
the Court banned LWOP for all nonhomicide juvenile offenders in Gra-
ham, proscribed mandatory LWOP for all corrigible juvenile homicide of-
fenders in Miller, and then, finally, retroactively applied Miller’s holding to
currently imprisoned corrigible juveniles in Montgomery v. Louisiana.39
The Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery together
demonstrate a progressive shift towards offering juvenile offenders leni-
ency in sentencing.40
The Court has revolutionized juvenile sentencing from a system that
condemned juvenile “super-predators” to death to a system that seeks to
offer these offenders rehabilitation and a second chance.41  As aforemen-
Wheelwright, Instilling Hope: Suggested Legislative Reform for Missouri Regarding Juve-
nile Sentencing Pursuant to Supreme Court Decisions in Miller and Montgomery, 82 MO.
L. REV. 267, 267–68 (2017) (discussing appearance and importance of hope in
juvenile sentencing).
37. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (recognizing differences
among juvenile and adult offenders, and how differences counsel against imposing
juvenile capital punishment).
38. See generally Andrea Huerta, Juvenile Offenders: Victims of Circumstance with a
Potential for Rehabilitation, 12 FIU L. REV. 187, 188–200 (2016) (considering recent
Supreme Court cases regarding juvenile sentencing and justifications behind
Court’s rationale).
39. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (announcing that
because Miller proclaimed new rule of substantive constitutional law, courts must
give Miller’s holding retroactive effect); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012)
(holding that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders violate these of-
fenders’ Eighth Amendment rights); Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (reasoning that be-
cause there is no single penological justification supporting LWOP sentences for
nonhomicide juvenile offenders, such sentences violate Eighth Amendment rights
for such offenders); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (prohibiting capital punishment for
juvenile offenders where eighteen of thirty-eight states precluded such punish-
ment and twelve states did not permit such punishment within their jurisdiction at
all).  Of particular importance, for courts to give Miller retroactive effect, states do
not need to relitigate sentences in which a juvenile offender received a mandatory
LWOP sentence—rather, “[a] state may remedy a Miller violation by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentenc-
ing them.” See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (reasoning that rather than resentence
all juvenile offenders under Miller, parole boards retain discretion in determining
a juvenile’s rehabilitation and ultimate release). But see Erica L. Ramstad, Monster
Under the Bed: The Nightmare of Leaving Juvenile Sentences up to the Parole Board, 64 S.D.
L. REV. 126 (2019) (providing overview of severe problems with granting parole
boards unchecked discretion in deciding whether to release juvenile offenders).
40. See Carl H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1788
(2016) (examining current revolution in juvenile justice in United States and how
Miller represents tremendous shift demonstrating Court’s intent to treat children
differently from adults in justice system).
41. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, The Youth Violence Epidemic: Myth or Real-
ity, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 727 (1998) (deducing that alleged “super-predator
scare” was fictitious after analyzing juvenile crime statistics in 1980s and 1990s).
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tioned, despite the Court’s movement towards mitigating harsh juvenile
sentences, a discordant split has developed among state and federal courts
regarding how to interpret Graham and Miller’s call for a meaningful op-
portunity to obtain release with respect to de facto LWOP sentences for
corrigible juvenile offenders.42  Regardless of this division, the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in its seminal juvenile sentencing cases indicates that
state and federal courts ought to protect corrigible juvenile offenders
from de facto LWOP sentences.43
A. A Promising Evolution in American Juvenile Sentencing
American juvenile sentencing practices have evolved to afford leni-
ency to juvenile offenders.44  A consensus among psychologists and sen-
tencing courts has emerged deeming juvenile offenders fundamentally
different from adults in terms of sentencing considerations.45  Neverthe-
less, the notion that states should sentence juveniles differently than adults
took time to develop.46
42. See infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text (discussing split among states
and federal courts as to whether to apply Graham and Miller’s holdings to de facto
LWOP sentences).
43. For a discussion of different interpretations of the Court’s “meaningful
opportunity for release,” see supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text and infra
notes 72–81 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Erin Dunn, Montgomery v. Louisiana: An Attempt to Make Juve-
nile Life Without Parole a Practical Impossibility, 32 TOURO L. REV. 679, 706–07 (2016)
(highlighting that Justice Anthony Kennedy, writer of majority opinion in Mont-
gomery, practically prohibited LWOP and is a leader in juvenile sentencing reform
and leniency).
45. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (stating that youths’ “lack
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . often result in im-
petuous and ill-considered actions and decisions”).  Pertinent to Johnson’s analysis
is the fact that the Court required sentencing judges to consider “youth as a miti-
gating factor” because the fundamental characteristics of youth are inherently
transient, in that as youths mature, their recklessness, and impetuosity tend to
subside:
A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. . . .  A sentencer in a capital case must be allowed to
consider the mitigating qualities of youth in the course of its delibera-
tions over the appropriate sentence.
Id. at 367 (providing justification as to why juveniles should receive more lenient
punishments); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (recogniz-
ing that youths are especially susceptible to negative influences, and therefore de-
serve leniency because they cannot control their conduct and appreciate the
consequences of their actions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (noting
formative qualities of childhood and adolescence that make youths susceptible to
criminal behavior); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (declaring differ-
ences between juveniles and adults in terms of culpability).
46. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (citing Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Im-
maturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 1009, 1014 (2003)) (stating that because juveniles have less control over their
environment, they may be more susceptible to outside pressures (e.g., peer pres-
8
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In the nineteenth century, in order to prosecute a minor between the
ages of seven and fourteen, the state had to overcome a presumption that
the child did not realize the wrongfulness of his or her actions.47  Subse-
quently, a progressive movement in the late 1890s encouraged states and
municipalities to establish juvenile courts that would promote the rehabili-
tation and welfare of juvenile offenders.48  Despite this initial trend in pro-
moting juvenile rehabilitation, the tide turned in the late 1960s and early
1970s, when society began to doubt the efficacy of prison as a means of
rehabilitation.49  For example, in 1974, a prominent American sociologist
published an infamous “nothing works” report on prison reform, which
stated that “[w]ith a few isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that
have been reported so far have no appreciable effect on recidivism.”50  De-
spite society’s emerging distrust of juvenile offenders, the Supreme Court
was noticeably concerned with these offenders’ vulnerability in the crimi-
nal justice system, and, thus, augmented the scope of juvenile offenders’
rights by requiring fair notice, assistance of counsel, privilege against self-
incrimination, and the right of appeal.51
sure, neighborhood influences, and familial influences), which consequently de-
creases culpability); Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v.
Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 9, 11–43 (2008) [hereinafter Feld, A Slower Form of Death] (examining
course of juvenile sentencing in American legal justice system, and highlighting
factors that make juveniles different from adults for sentencing purposes).
47. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 503, 510–11 (1984) (discussing that rebuttable presumption of incapacity
exists for children between ages of seven and fourteen, who would not inherently
realize wrongfulness of their actions); see also Commonwealth v. Mead, 92 Mass.
(10 Allen) 398, 400 (1865) (affirming new trial for juvenile girl because facts in
record did not establish that she knew her actions were unlawful). But see Willet v.
Commonwealth, 76 Ky. 230, 231–32 (1877) (stating that juvenile’s knowledge of
difference between right and wrong is sufficient to demonstrate that juvenile may
have appreciated consequences of their actions).
48. See Feld, A Slower Form of Death, supra note 46, at 15–18 (discussing how
progressives created alternative justice system for juvenile offenders, one based on
rehabilitation rather than punishment).  There is a “rehabilitative ideal” rooted in
the juvenile justice system that views juvenile offenders as capable of change and
betterment, and this ideology asserts the notion that society ought to intervene to
save children from the ills of crime. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread:
Diversion in Juvenile Justice, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2477, 2480 (2000) (arguing that justice
system ought to sentence children differently than adults).
49. See generally Singer, supra note 29, at 719 (discussing expansion of juvenile
transfer laws under fictitious “super-predator” scare).
50. See id. at 707 (describing impetus of criminal justice system’s movement
away from rehabilitation and towards retribution).
51. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33–58 (1967) (procedural requirements of
notice, fair hearing, assistance of counsel, opportunity to confront and cross ex-
amine witnesses, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to appeal all extend
to juvenile offenders); see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 564–65 (1966)
(requiring that protections afforded to adult offenders in criminal process are also
afforded to juvenile offenders). But see State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 53 (Iowa
2013) (arguing that although Kent and In re Gault valued extension of juvenile
9
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Notwithstanding the Court’s concern for juvenile offenders’ inaliena-
ble rights, an intense fear of dangerous juveniles pervaded the 1980s and
early 1990s—a period distinguished by a marked increase in the length of
juvenile sentences.52  Prominent political scientists endorsed the idea that
a group of irredeemable juveniles, possessing no moral compass, would
commit atrocious acts of violence.53  The term “super-predator” emerged
to denote this predicted surge of juvenile offenders who “fear[ed] neither
the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment,” and were “capable of
committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for the most trivial
reasons.”54  As this sentiment infiltrated society, legislatures in forty-five
states enacted laws rendering juvenile offenders eligible for adult
sentences.55  Additionally, legislatures also expanded the breadth of of-
fenses that either allowed or required states to transfer juveniles to adult
prisons and stressed public interests of safety and offender accountability
over the value of juvenile rehabilitation.56
offenders’ criminal rights, cases may have instilled mindset of increasing exposure
of youths to adult criminal sentencing).
52. See John R. Mills, Anna M. Dorn & Amelia Courtney Hritz, Juvenile Life
Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway, 65 AM. U.
L. REV. 535, 560–63 (2016) (stating that 1990s saw dramatic increase in number of
juveniles sentenced to LWOP).
53. See John Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD
(Nov. 27, 1995), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-
coming-of-the-super-predators [https://perma.cc/E8BG-Q798] (predicting on-
slaught of “tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile super-
predators” that would threaten stability of society); see also The Superpreditor Myth, 20
Years Later, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Feb. 13, 2014), https://eji.org/news/super-
predator-myth-20-years-later [https://perma.cc/YPL2-U9P7] (reporting that in
1990s, criminologist James Alan Fox stated “[u]nless we act today, we’re going to
have a bloodbath when these kids grow up” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54. See Dilulio, supra note 53 (discussing advent of juvenile “super-predator”);
see also Null, 836 N.W.2d at 53–54 (discussing how states began to enact laws in
1990s expanding exposure of juveniles to criminal sanctions by encouraging courts
to try juvenile offenders in adult rather than juvenile courts); Mills, supra note 52,
at 560–63 (discussing impact of Princeton Professor John Dilulio’s “super-
predator” warning in time of increasing panic of potentially dangerous juvenile
offenders); id. (discussing impact of 1990’s on juvenile sentencing); The Rest of
Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States, Sentencing of
Youth to Life Without Parole, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 11,
2005), https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/10/11/rest-their-lives/life-without-pa
role-child-offenders-united-states [https://perma.cc/6DU2-D5TQ] (reflecting per-
meating fear of juvenile predators in nationwide sentencing practices, “in eleven
out of the seventeen years between 1985 and 2001, youth convicted of murder in
the United States were more likely to enter prison with a life without parole sen-
tence than adult murder offenders” (emphasis in original).
55. See Mills, et al., supra note 52, at 582 (quoting Clinton Cites Need for Role
Models, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at 3) (discussing how super-predator myth
“captured popular and political imaginations”).
56. See generally Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymanski, DEP’T OF JUST., State Legis-
lative Responses to Violent Juvenile Crime: 1996–97 Update, JUV. JUST. BULL., Nov. 1998,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172835.pdf  [https://perma.cc/QKW2-TWBZ]
(reviewing pertinent factors influencing sentencing decisions in 1990s).
10
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The predicted threat of juvenile super-predators, however, never
came to fruition.57  In the early 2000s, following the 1990’s blitzkrieg of
increasingly harsh juvenile sentencing practices, developments in psychol-
ogy and neuroscience reinforced the traditional notion that juveniles and
adults are indeed quite different in terms of culpability.58  In Roper, Gra-
ham, and Miller, the Court relied, in part, on scientific evidence indicating
that because the juvenile brain is underdeveloped, courts should sentence
juveniles and adults differently.59  This difference between children and
adults, especially with respect to the ability to make rational choices, led
courts, psychologists, and society as a whole, to conclude that juveniles
should not receive the most unforgiving sentences.60
57. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 56 (discussing how Dilulio’s prediction of “super-
predator” era had failed to materialize, and how this theory was utterly incorrect);
see also Mills et al., supra note 52, at 585 (stating how criminologists who predicted
endemic of juvenile “super-predators” were incorrect).  After conceding that the
juvenile “super-predator” era had failed to transpire, both Professor Dilulio and
Professor Fox submitted amicus briefs in support of the petitioners in Miller, argu-
ing that mandatory LWOP sentences imposed on the fourteen-year-olds violated
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See
id. (citing Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
37, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9647, 10-9646)) (detailing how comprehensive
research exists demonstrating that predictions regarding juvenile super-predator
era were wrong and admitted that the super-predator myth created an undeserving
and excessive juvenile punishment scheme).
58. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (stating that “as any par-
ent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici
cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of  maturity and an underdeveloped sense of respon-
sibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young’” (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 367 (1993))).  In reference to capital juvenile punishment, the Court in Roper
rationalized that because it is difficult for expert psychologists to diagnose any ju-
venile under the age of eighteen as possessing an antisocial personality disorder,
states cannot seek capital punishment in juvenile cases. See id. at 573–74 (citing
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 46, at 1014)) (discussing implications of advances in
juvenile neuroscience on rendering juveniles less culpable for their crimes).
59. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–73 (2012) (discussing how Roper
and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for
sentencing purposes).  While the Roper Court cited scientific studies that estab-
lished that only a small proportion of adolescents who engage in illegal behavior
develop an engrained pattern of such problem behavior, the Graham Court like-
wise noted that developments in neuroscience and psychology demonstrate differ-
ences between adult and juvenile cognitive capabilities, thereby lessening a
juvenile’s moral culpability. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2011) (provid-
ing fundamental differences between adult and juvenile brains and why this dis-
similarity requires different sentences).
60. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569) (establishing that
because juveniles have lessened culpability, they are less deserving of most severe
punishments); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 461 (affirming how both Roper and Graham
demonstrate that imposing state’s harshest penalties, mandatory LWOP, precludes
sentencing judges from accounting for all particular characteristics that accom-
pany youth); Cohen et al., supra note 17, at 34 (examining national effort to elimi-
nate irrational sentencing practices that sentence children as adults in United
States).  The most recent studies assessing youth crime and recidivism support the
Court’s categorical prohibition of the most extreme punishments based on age
11
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B. A Progressive Expansion of What Constitutes Cruel and Unusual
Punishment for Juvenile Offenders Under the Eighth Amendment
Juvenile offenders’ Eighth Amendment rights evolved parallel to juve-
nile sentencing reform.61  The Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution states “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”62  Tradition-
ally, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment is
evaluated against “the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society,” and as a result, the Eighth Amendment must
adapt to imitate reformed societal values.63  Therefore, the Supreme
Court looks to contemporary societal norms to determine which juvenile
sentences are so disproportionate as to be considered cruel and unusual.64
The Court often measures what society values by determining
whether a national consensus against applying a particular punishment
exists.65  In making this determination, the Court examines legislative en-
actments and actual state sentencing practices.66  For example, in Roper
and developmental immaturity. See Cohen et al., supra note 17, at 34–35 (explain-
ing that landmark quartet of Supreme Court cases coupled with follow-up studies
on youth crime and recidivism rates support contention that certain characteristics
of adolescence, diminished culpability and capacity for rehabilitation, render most
extreme sentences available under law cruel and unusual as applied to juvenile
offenders).
61. See generally Kathryn McEvilly, Crying Mercy: Life Without Parole for Fourteen-
Year-Old Offenders in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 231, 234–37 (2012) (analyzing how Eighth Amendment has
evolved with juvenile sentencing and Supreme Court jurisprudence in Miller and
Graham).
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
367 (1910) (holding that Eighth Amendment guarantees individual right not to
receive excessive sanctions, and such right flows from basic “precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense”).
63. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (declaring that Eighth Amend-
ment is not static, but rather derives its meaning from societal standards of
decorum).
64. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 818–38 (1988)) (reasoning that national standards of decency do not permit
execution of any offender under age sixteen at time of crime); see also Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–15 (2002) (determining existence of national consen-
sus against death penalty for entire category of offenders with mental disabilities,
and therefore capital punishment is limited to narrow category of offenders who
commit most serious crimes, whose extreme culpability make them most deserving
of execution).
65. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (pronouncing that capital punishment of
mentally disabled is cruel and unusual punishment due to national consensus
among states abrogating such sentences).
66. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2011) (illustrating that Eighth
Amendment analysis begins with consideration of legislation, and then moves to
actual sentencing practices); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989)
(announcing that in determining whether national consensus has emerged against
particular punishment, Court looks to legislative enactments and actual sentencing
practices, as this portrays most objective evidence of societal values).
12
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and Miller, the Court evaluated relevant state statistics in determining the
emergence of a national consensus against inflicting the death penalty and
mandatory LWOP sentences upon juvenile offenders.67  Such a consensus
demonstrates a compassionate trend against subjecting juveniles to exces-
sively harsh sentences.68
In addition to searching for the existence of a national consensus, the
Court also considers whether a particular punishment furthers classic pe-
nological justifications—such as incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution.69  The Court has repeatedly found that the standard pe-
nological justifications applicable to adults may not justify extreme
sentences for juvenile offenders who, among other considerations, possess
diminished culpability.70  The Court’s reasoning seemingly applies to both
juvenile LWOP sentences by name as well as juvenile de facto LWOP
sentences because both punishments seek to imprison the offender until
death, and therefore disregard rehabilitation.71
67. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 482–85, (2012) (explaining that ob-
jective indicia of legislative enactments and actual state sentencing practices coun-
sel against mandatory LWOP sentences); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65
(justifying proscribing juvenile death penalty, especially based on fact that al-
though twenty states have not outlawed practice, such punishment is incredibly
rare).
68. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–66 (finding national consensus against im-
position of death penalty has emerged for offenders who were under age eighteen
at time they committed crime because thirty states prohibit execution of offenders
under age eighteen); see also Mills et al, supra note 52, at 541–42 (commenting that
Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller demonstrate increased alacrity in
protecting juvenile offenders).  The Court in Roper found a national directional
change in its analysis of categorically prohibiting juvenile capital punishment—it is
not necessarily the amount of states that is most important, rather it is the unwaver-
ing trend of change. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (detailing its national consensus
analysis).
69. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (stating that in making its own independent
determination, Court is “guided by ‘the standards elaborated by controlling prece-
dents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose’” (quoting Kennedy v. Louisi-
ana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008))).  If a court finds that the sentence lacks an associa-
tion to rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation, or deterrence, then the sentence
is inherently disproportionate to the offense. See id. at 74 (extrapolating on Roper’s
analysis that neither incapacitation nor rehabilitation can serve as legitimate ratio-
nalizations for imposing harshest sentences on juvenile offenders because it is im-
possible to make determination that juveniles are incorrigible at outset of
adolescence given juvenile offenders’ capacity for rehabilitation); see also Roper, 543
U.S. at 568 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319) (discussing how neither retribution nor
deterrence can serve as sufficient justification for imposing harshest possible sen-
tence on juvenile offenders).
70. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (recognizing that LWOP sentence “forswears
altogether the rehabilitative ideal,” and although states are not required to guaran-
tee juvenile offender’s freedom, states must provide defendant with genuine
chance to attain release based on reform and remorse).
71. See Stephanie N. O’Banion, Dying in Detention: Are Life Without Parole
Sentences for Juvenile Non-Homicide Offenders Always Unconstitutionally Cruel and Unu-
sual Under the Eighth Amendment?, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 449, 467 (2013) (discussing
how courts have reached inconsistent, and sometimes conflicting, conclusions re-
13
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C. An Opportunity for Optimism in States’ Definitions of
“Meaningful Opportunity for Release”
The period of time following the Court’s revolutionary holdings in
Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery was marked by a newfound hope for
thousands of juvenile prisoners;72 no longer could states sentence
juveniles to death or mandatory LWOP punishments.73  Instead, Miller re-
quires states to examine mitigating factors of a juvenile offender’s child-
hood and upbringing in the hope that sentencing judges would reserve
grave LWOP punishments for only the extremely rare and incorrigible ju-
venile offenders.74  Despite this progressive line of Supreme Court cases,
some states still seek to punish juveniles as adults, ignoring data that
strongly encourages otherwise.75
The conflict arises over whether courts should narrowly apply the
holdings of Graham and Miller to proscribe juvenile LWOP sentences by
name, or broadly apply these holdings to prevent juvenile de facto life
sentences that intentionally deny or severely delay a corrigible juvenile of-
fender’s parole eligibility.76  Although the Court mandated in Graham and
garding whether to extend Court’s penological justification analysis, as seen in
Roper, Graham, and Miller, to lengthy term-of-years sentences for juvenile
offenders).
72. See generally Alexander J. Wolfe, Criminal Law—A Denial of Hope: Bear
Cloud III and the Aggregate Sentencing of Juveniles; Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113,
334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014), 17 WYO. L. REV. 343, 367–70 (2017) (discussing implica-
tions of Miller and Montgomery and how such cases should counsel states towards
rehabilitation rather than imposing lengthy term-of-years sentences and LWOP
sentences).
73. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 475–76 (2012) (establishing that
because Graham likens LWOP sentences to capital punishment, which is unconsti-
tutional following Roper, mandatory LWOP sentences are inherently unconstitu-
tional); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (holding that courts cannot impose death
penalty on juvenile offenders).
74. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476 (stating requirement that capital defendants have
opportunity to present mitigating factors to judge or jury in order to make sure
that death penalty is reserved for only the most deserving of criminals).  The Miller
court then went on to explain that juveniles possess diminished culpability, which
distinguishes them from adults for sentencing purposes, and that sentencing
judges miss critical characteristics of youth when deciding to sentence such indi-
viduals to mandatory LWOP sentences. See id. at 476–78.
75. See Moore v. Biter, 742 F.3d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 2014) (delineating several
cases that hold that Graham does not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences
that resemble Moore’s sentence); cf. Meredith Lamberti, Children Are Different: Why
Iowa Should Adopt a Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Homi-
cide Offenders, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 330–37 (2015) (discussing historical surveys
and psychological studies that conclude that because juveniles are different from
adults for sentencing purposes, states should categorically ban LWOP as sentenc-
ing option, whether sentence is LWOP by name or LWOP by way of an aggregate
term-of-years sentence).
76. See Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1057 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying
Graham to all sentences that would effectively deny offenders chance of obtaining
release during natural lifetime); see also Goins v. Smith, 556 F. App’x 434, 440 (6th
Cir. 2014) (holding that because defendant’s sentence is not technically LWOP,
14
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Miller that juvenile offenders receive a meaningful opportunity to obtain
release and individualized sentencing hearings to examine incorrigibility,
the Court did not clarify (1) whether these holdings apply to de facto
LWOP sentences, or (2) at what age an offender may still lead a meaning-
ful and productive life outside of prison.77  This ambiguity has led some
state and federal courts to unapologetically sentence corrigible juveniles
to de facto term-of-year sentences (exceeding or closely exceeding the of-
fender’s life expectancy) under the reasoning that because the court does
not label these sentences specifically as LWOP, such sentences do not fall
within the protections of Graham and Miller.78
Several state and federal courts have concluded that term-of-years
sentences that afford corrigible juveniles parole at any point within a juve-
nile’s lifetime are constitutional, even if the juveniles are not eligible for
parole until their late sixties.79  Conversely, other state and federal courts
hold that when parole eligibility under a term-of-years sentence occurs
close to or exceeds a juvenile defendant’s life expectancy, there is an in-
herent constitutional violation of Graham and Miller.80  Fortunately, the
Graham’s categorical rule does not apply); People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 454
(Cal. 2018) (stating Graham applies broadly to juvenile sentence that in reality acts
as de facto life sentence); Ira v. Janecka, 419 P.3d 161, 164–65 (N.M. 2018) (stating
that Graham applies when multiple term-of-years sentences will in all likelihood
keep juvenile in prison for remainder of their life because juvenile is deprived
meaningful opportunity to obtain release); cf. McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908,
914 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that while Miller does not expressly forbid life
sentences for juvenile murderers, it expresses great skepticism in exposing
juveniles to such sentence, and repeatedly states that courts should save LWOP
sentences for only irretrievably incorrigible offenders); State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410,
415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding aggregate sentence of 139.75 years under
Eighth Amendment analysis). But see United States v. Bryant, 609 F. App’x 925,
927–28 (9th Cir. 2015) (determining aggregate eighty-year sentence does not vio-
late Eighth Amendment).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2018), reh’g
en banc granted, vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018) (case listed for rehearing en
banc Feb. 20, 2019) (discussing different circuit approaches to applying Graham
and Miller to de facto term-of-years sentences); see also id. at 150–51 (asserting that
Graham Court failed to answer question of at what age offenders are still capable of
living “meaningful” life, in that it is not clear whether age fifty, age sixty, or age
seventy is ceiling).
78. For examples of different approaches to whether Graham and Miller apply
to de facto life sentences see infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Lucero v. People, 394 P.3d 1128, 1134  (Colo. 2017) (holding that
eighty-four-year sentence was not de facto LWOP sentence because defendant
would be eligible for parole at age fifty-seven). Compare State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d
42, 70–71 (Iowa 2013) (asserting that an aggregate term-of-years sentence that pre-
cludes parole eligibility after fifty-two and a half years violates Miller because it is
incompatible with hope of rehabilitation and does not account for defendant’s
diminished culpability), with Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 2012)
(stating that defendant’s sentence did not violate clearly established federal law
because Graham did not explicitly proscribe lengthy term-of-years sentence).
80. See, e.g., Moore, 725 F.3d at 1191–92 (finding sentence of 254 years with no
opportunity for parole within defendant’s lifetime equivalent to LWOP); see also
People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (holding 110-year sentence is
15
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Third Circuit has provided an encouraging step towards parsing out the
Supreme Court’s meaningful opportunity to obtain release by utilizing the
national age of retirement as a potential benchmark.81
III. INCREMENTAL HOPE: THE FACTS OF GRANT
Corey Grant was thirteen-years-old when he joined a narcotics ring.82
In August 1989, Grant, who was sixteen years old at the time, encountered
a group of rival drug dealers while delivering narcotics for his gang.83
Grant warned the group not to operate its drug dealings within his gang’s
territory, but when one of the rivals refused, Grant ordered his associate to
shoot and kill the rival gang member.84  Grant’s associate did as he was
told and fatally shot the rival gang member.85
On January 25, 1991, the United States charged Grant under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for conspir-
acy, racketeering, conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute co-
caine, possession of a weapon in relation to a crime of violence and drug
trafficking, and first-degree murder.86  Although Grant was not yet eigh-
teen years old at the time of his crime, he was tried as an adult in February
1992.87  The jury convicted Grant of RICO conspiracy, racketeering, drug
virtually de facto life sentence); cf. Springer v. Dooley, No. 3:15-CV-03008-RAL,
2015 WL 6550876, at *7 (D.S.D. Oct. 28, 2015) (stating that when term-of-years
sentences come close to or exceed defendant’s life expectancy, defendant’s Eighth
Amendment rights are violated); see also Boneshirt v. United States, Nos. CIV 13-
3008-RAL, (10-CR-30008-RAL), 2014 WL 6605613, at *8 (D.S.D Nov. 19, 2014)
(concluding that de facto life sentences effectively guaranteeing that juvenile will
die in prison without meaningful opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation violate
Graham and Miller).
81. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 153 (discerning that although Third Circuit adopted
rebuttable presumption that sentencing, courts ought not to sentence juvenile
above national age of retirement, sentencing judges still “retain the discretion to
sentence incorrigible juvenile offenders to LWOP and non-incorrigible ones to
term-of-years sentences beyond the national age of retirement but below life
expectancy”).
82. See id. at 135 (providing background on E-Port Posse, which is an organ-
ized gang of teenagers who operated narcotics network that would buy multi-kilo-
gram amounts of cocaine in New York City and then sell drugs in Elizabeth, New
Jersey).
83. See id. (providing backdrop for Grant’s encounters with independent drug
dealers).  Prior to Grant’s confrontation with Mario Lee, Grant met his brother,
Dion Lee, and warned Lee to stay out of the Posse’s territory. See id. (delineating
Grant’s encounter with Dion Lee).  When Lee refused to stay out of the Posse’s
territory, Grant struck Lee in the head with a gun and shot Lee in the leg, but Lee
survived. See id. at 136  (providing background of relationship between Grant and
Lee brothers).
84. See id. (asserting that Grant ordered Lee’s murder).
85. See id. (declaring Grant responsible for Lee’s murder).
86. See id. (enumerating charges against Grant).
87. See id. (asserting that Grant was tried as an adult despite being under
eighteen).
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possession, gun possession, and, most significantly, murder—the judge
had no choice but to impose a mandatory LWOP sentence.88
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller (i.e., that
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violate their
Eighth Amendment rights) Grant sought leave from district court to file a
motion for resentencing.89  Grant argued that he received a LWOP sen-
tence without a consideration of his diminished culpability and disadvan-
taged upbringing.90  The district court agreed and ordered Grant’s
resentencing.91
At resentencing, the district court determined that Grant’s upbring-
ing, youth, and post-conviction record demonstrated that he was corrigi-
ble.92  Therefore, under Miller, a LWOP sentence was inappropriate.93
Nevertheless, the district court imposed a term-of-years sentence of sixty-
fiveyears’ imprisonment, and explained that the sentence afforded Grant
equity and safeguarded the public interest.94  Assuming good time credit,
Grant would be eligible for parole at age seventy-two, the effective
equivalent of his life expectancy.95
IV. FORGIVING JUVENILES IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT:
A COMPASSIONATE ANALYSIS THAT JUVENILE DE FACTO LIFE
SENTENCES WITHOUT PAROLE ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The issue presented in Grant is one of first impression: whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibits a term-of-years sentence equal to a juvenile
88. See id. (explaining that LWOP sentences on two RICO counts arose from
then-mandatory sentencing guidelines).
89. See id. (declaring that Grant filed motion for resentencing under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, which asserts that second motion for resentencing “must be certi-
fied . . . by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain . . . a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable.”).
90. See id. (reasoning that based on Miller’s holding, Grant was eligible for
individualized resentencing hearing).
91. See id. (agreeing that sentencing court needs to consider Grant’s youth
before imposing sentence of LWOP).
92. See id. at 136–37 (asserting that after evaluating Grant’s “upbringing,
debilitating characteristics of youth, and post-conviction record,” the court deter-
mined that he was corrigible, and therefore LWOP sentence was inappropriate
under Miller).
93. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012) (explaining that when
sentencing juvenile homicide offenders, judge and jury must have chance to assess
mitigating factors of youth, to ensure that harshest sentencing punishments—i.e.
LWOP—are reserved for only incorrigible juvenile offenders).
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C) (2018) (stating courts shall consider
“the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; . . .
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”).
95. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 137 (contending that Grant’s new sentence is essen-
tially de facto LWOP).
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homicide offender’s life expectancy when the crime represents the juve-
nile’s transient immaturity rather than irreparable corruption (i.e., incor-
rigibility).96  More precisely, the Third Circuit had to determine whether
Grant’s sixty-five-year de facto life sentence was consistent with Graham’s
mandate to provide juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain
release, Miller’s directive to confine LWOP sentences to incorrigible juve-
nile offenders, and the classic penological sentencing justifications.97  In
approaching this issue, the Third Circuit reasoned that because juvenile
de facto life sentences do not promote juvenile rehabilitation or consider
juvenile corrigibility, such sentences inherently violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.98  The Third Circuit then employed a novel analysis utilizing the
national age of retirement as a sentencing factor to standardize Graham’s
meaningful opportunity to obtain release.99  The Third Circuit explained
that utilizing the national age of retirement as a sentencing factor fulfilled
the fundamental decrees of both Graham and Miller: preventing states
from stifling juvenile rehabilitation.100
A. Progressive Propositions Arising from Supreme Court Juvenile Sentencing
Cases as Revisited in Grant
The Third Circuit began its analysis with an overview of the Supreme
Court’s landmark juvenile sentencing cases.101  The Third Circuit de-
duced that because the Court’s holdings in Graham and Miller seek to ad-
96. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (holding that judge and jury must have opportu-
nity to consider mitigating characteristics of youth before imposing harshest possi-
ble penalty for juveniles); see also Grant, 887 F.3d at 142 (requiring that juveniles
convicted of homicide receive LWOP sentences, regardless of age or age-related
circumstances, violates Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment); see also Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1057, 1058 (10th Cir. 2017)
(emphasizing states may not avoid constitutional bar on LWOP sentences by sim-
ply not qualifying sentence as LWOP).
97. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 135 (stating case presents difficult questions, includ-
ing establishing more robust framework to present non-incorrigible juvenile of-
fenders with “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”).
98. See id. at 142 (delineating primary reasons why Grant’s term-of-years sen-
tence violates Eighth Amendment: Miller reserves LWOP—de facto or otherwise—
for only permanently incorrigible juvenile offenders, lack of penological justifica-
tion rationalizing de facto life sentences, and inconsistency of de facto with Graham
and Miller objectives).
99. See id. at 152–53 (defining national age of retirement as rebuttable pre-
sumption sentencing factor that lower courts must consider when fashioning term-
of-years sentences); cf. Casiano v. Comm’r of Correction, 115 A.3d 1031, 1046–47
(Conn. 2015) (noting that retirement age is most effective indicator of establishing
parole eligibility under presumption that this is time when employment opportuni-
ties diminish for most workers).
100. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 150–51 (theorizing that because national age of
retirement affords corrigible juveniles with “‘hope’ and a chance for . . . ‘reconcili-
ation with society,’” that this sentencing factor will spur offenders’ motivation to-
wards rehabilitation and self-actualization).
101. See id. at 137–42 (examining most important takeaways from Roper, Gra-
ham, Miller, and Montgomery, and how each holding interconnects).
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vance juvenile rehabilitation and do not turn on whether a court
specifically designated the sentence as LWOP, these holdings broadly pro-
hibit any life sentence that precludes a corrigible juvenile offender from
attaining parole before, or shortly before, their life expectancy.102  There-
fore, the Third Circuit reasoned that de facto LWOP sentences are analo-
gous to LWOP because de facto life sentences (1) delay parole for the
offender’s entire life, (2) fail to distinguish between incorrigibility and
corrigibility, and (3) conflict with classic penological sentencing
justifications.103
1. Why Corrigible Juveniles Deserve Hope Under the Eighth Amendment
A fundamental realization arising during the Court’s era of progres-
sive juvenile sentencing is that juvenile offenders should not receive the
most severe punishments because they are innately less culpable than
adults.104  Minors are more susceptible to rehabilitation, and therefore
courts should sentence these offenders differently—keeping in mind their
102. See id. at 142, 150–51 (holding Eighth Amendment prohibits term-of-
years sentence that meets or exceeds juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy
when the offender’s crime reflects “transient immaturity and not irreparable cor-
ruption,” and corrigible juvenile offenders presumptively should receive opportu-
nity of release before national age of retirement); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 474 (2012) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010)) (underscoring that
Graham’s treatment of juvenile LWOP sentences as analogous to capital punish-
ment stresses that harshest punishments available under law are especially extreme
when imposed on juveniles); Grant, 887 F.3d at 143  (stressing that both formal
LWOP sentences and term-of-years de facto life sentences without parole seek to
imprison offender until he or she dies (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75)); cf.
McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016) (asserting that 100-year sen-
tence is in fact de facto life sentence, and so rationale behind Miller applies—court
must afford defendant with individualized sentencing hearing considering mitigat-
ing factors of youth before imposing LWOP sentence). But see Lucero v. People,
395 P.3d 1128, 1133 (Colo. 2017) (emphasizing that multiple sentences for multi-
ple times when aggregated together is not equivalent of LWOP even though defen-
dant is incarcerated for life).
103. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526
(1989)) (stating that LWOP sentence eviscerates hope and spirit); see also Grant,
887 F.3d at 147 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 79) (explaining meaning behind
Graham and Miller’s “meaningful opportunity for release”); cf. State v. Zuber, 152
A.3d 197, 209–10 (N.J. 2017) (stating that because Court did not define “meaning-
ful opportunity,” it intended to leave interpretation in given state’s jurisdiction to
explore means of compliance); see also Krisztina Schlessel, Graham’s Applicability to
Term-of-Years Sentences and Mandate to Provide a “Meaningful Opportunity” for Release,
40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1027, 1060–61 (2013) (stating that most provident way to
fulfill Graham’s mandate of providing meaningful opportunity for release is to pro-
vide offender chance for parole regardless of sentence’s length).
104. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70 (2005) (explaining that be-
cause juveniles lack maturity, are more vulnerable to negative influences, and pos-
sess more transient personality than adults, such differences prohibit categorizing
juveniles as worst offenders under law); see also Grant, 887 F.3d at 138 (citing Roper,
543 U.S. at 569–70) (stating that court cannot categorize juvenile offenders with
adult offenders).
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diminished culpability.105  The Court reasoned time and again in its juve-
nile jurisprudence that, relative to adults, juveniles lack maturity, are more
susceptible to negative influences, and possess a more transformative per-
sonality.106  Therefore, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the imposi-
tion of the most severe punishments on youth is cruel and unjust.107
Accordingly, the Third Circuit determined that LWOP is an overly
severe punishment for juvenile offenders because such sentences fail to
appreciate a juvenile’s potential for rehabilitation and diminished culpa-
bility.108  The Third Circuit likened LWOP to capital punishment in that
both sentences irrevocably alter the offender’s life by depriving them of
basic liberties without any hope for amends.109  Critically, the Third Cir-
cuit classified juvenile de facto LWOP as unconstitutional under the same
considerations supporting the unconstitutionality of LWOP by name—
such as disregard for rehabilitation and diminished culpability, and lack of
penological sentencing justifications.110  Further, The Third Circuit as-
serted that although states do not need to guarantee a corrigible of-
fender’s eventual release, states must devise a realistic way to afford the
105. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75 (asserting that rehabilitation cannot justify
juvenile LWOP sentences because sentences do not appreciate juveniles’ capacity
for change and diminished culpability); see also Grant, 887 F.3d at 138 (citing Roper,
543 U.S. at 570) (affirming that based on Roper’s rationale, juvenile offenders are
not deserving of most severe punishments because there is greater likelihood that
juveniles will be reformed); see also People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 483 (Cal.
2018) (explaining that juveniles sentenced to LWOP have little rehabilitative in-
centive, and rehabilitation is core value of juvenile justice system).
106. For a discussion of progressive Supreme Court juvenile sentencing cases
in the twenty-first century, see infra notes 112–24 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (explaining that because
juveniles possess underdeveloped understanding of their actions, courts cannot
categorize them among worst offenders deserving most severe sentences); see also
Miller, 567 U.S. at 476 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (stat-
ing that adolescence is time in life where one’s personality is entirely transient); cf.
Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 267 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016)) (contending that sentencing judge violates Miller’s
holding any time it imposes discretionary mandatory LWOP sentence on juvenile
homicide offender because of transient qualities of youth).
108. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (declaring LWOP
the second most severe penalty under law); see also Grant, 887 F.3d at 138 (citing
Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70) (concluding that much like Roper Court found juvenile
capital punishment to violate Eighth Amendment, Graham Court found LWOP
analogously severe and to also violate Eighth Amendment rights).
109. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (stating that although state does not execute
offenders sentenced to LWOP, there is similar deprivation of life and liberty); see
also Grant, 887 F.3d at 138 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70) (comparing simi-
larities between LWOP and capital punishment, such as depriving juvenile of fun-
damental liberties); cf. Feld, A Slower Form of Death, supra note 46, at 12
(recommending that same juvenile developmental attributes that reduce adoles-
cents’ criminal responsibility for purposes of death penalty should similarly coun-
sel against LWOP sentences for nonhomicide and homicide crimes).
110. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 143–45 (declaring that reasons underlying uncon-
stitutionality of de jure LWOP sentences apply with equal force to de facto LWOP
sentences).
20
Submission to Villanova Law Review
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
2019] NOTE 619
offender hope of release because Miller precludes a rehabilitated juvenile’s
death in prison.111
a. Miller’s Preclusion of LWOP for Corrigible Juvenile Offenders
The Third Circuit emphasized that a sentence that treats a corrigible
juvenile offender as incorrigible is inconsistent with Miller.112  Although
leading psychologists debate whether an expert may deem a juvenile in-
corrigible at such a young age, a time when their personality may be
wholly transient, incorrigible offenders are most usually marked by an an-
tisocial personality disorder leading to irreparable corruption.113 Miller
set aside discretionary LWOP sentences for only the rarest incorrigible ju-
venile, who is incapable of rehabilitation.114 Miller implicitly denotes that
corrigible juveniles possess a constitutional right to parole, and thus courts
may not sentence a juvenile, with the capacity for rehabilitation, to a de
facto life sentence without violating the juvenile’s Eighth Amendment
rights.115  Indeed, the Third Circuit deduced that it would defy common
sense if sentencing courts could circumvent Miller’s mandate—reserving
111. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 143–44 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 75) (stating that
crux of what Third Circuit examines in Grant is whether de facto life sentences,
rather than LWOP sentences by name, inhibit Graham’s objective of affording
juveniles meaningful chance of release).
112. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 142 (asserting that because neither LWOP
sentences nor de facto term-of-years life sentences for corrigible juvenile offenders
appreciate how children are fundamentally different from adults, both sentences
violate Miller); see also Greiman v. Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 3d 933, 943 (S.D. Iowa 2015)
(arguing it is infeasible to proffer meaningful opportunity of release to defendant
who is sentenced to de facto LWOP beyond life expectancy); see also Hayden v.
Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1009 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (affirming that even if juvenile
offender’s sentence is labeled as one “with parole,” it is equivalent to life sentence
without parole, and state has violated offender’s Eighth Amendment rights be-
cause particular sentence fails to consider juvenile’s diminished capacity and po-
tential for reformation).
113. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (delineating attributes
of anti-social personality disorder and how such traits are fleeting in juveniles). See
generally Vanessa L. Kolbe, A Cloudy Crystal Ball: Concerns Regarding the Use of Juvenile
Psychopathy Scores in Juvenile Waiver Hearings, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 16–20
(2007) (detailing attributes of psychopathy and why it is difficult to extend such
attributes to juveniles).
114. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (declaring that it is
essential for sentencing judges to distinguish between incorrigible juvenile offend-
ers and juveniles capable of rehabilitation because it is essential to take such differ-
ences into account and to not incarcerate corrigible juveniles beyond time in
which they can demonstrate rehabilitation).
115. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (declaring that
Miller forbids court from imposing LWOP upon entire class of rehabilitated juve-
nile offenders, “whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”); see also
Grant, 887 F.3d at 143 (declaring that sentencing courts may only impose LWOP
upon corrigible juvenile offender).
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LWOP sentences for only the exceedingly rare incorrigible juvenile of-
fender—by regularly imposing extensive term-of-years sentences.116
b. Lack of Penological Justifications for De Facto LWOP Sentences
Supreme Court precedent also required the Grant Court to consider
fundamental penological justifications for de facto LWOP sentences,
which, according to the Court, fail in light of the reduced culpability of
juvenile offenders.117  The Third Circuit reasoned that because the Court
was unable to find a single penological justification for LWOP sentences in
Graham and Miller, de facto LWOP sentences lack a penological justifica-
tion because such sentences also shirk rehabilitation and condemn
juveniles to imprisonment for an inordinate length of time.118  Of particu-
lar significance, the Third Circuit held that there is an irreconcilable ten-
116. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 143 (asserting that Miller’s holding broadly applies
to de facto LWOP sentences); see also id. at 145–46 (discussing other circuits’ deci-
sions of whether to apply Miller’s holding broadly to de facto term-of-years
sentences without opportunity of parole); see also Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d
1047, 1056 (10th Cir. 2017) (concluding 155-year sentence violated Eighth
Amendment because Graham created categorical rule, which says states cannot
evade Graham and Miller by simply not labeling punishment as LWOP); Moore v.
Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that state court’s failure to
apply Graham to 254-year sentence was contrary to Supreme Court precedent be-
cause Graham’s holding did not turn on label of life sentence, both LWOP and de
facto LWOP sentences deny juvenile hope of societal reintegration, and de facto
LWOP sentence goes against Graham’s mandate of providing “meaningful oppor-
tunity to reenter society”); cf. McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016)
(applying logic of Miller to vacate 100-year sentence imposed on corrigible juvenile
offender because court did not consider Miller’s mandate of evaluating mitigating
characteristics of youth). But see United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1018–19
(8th Cir. 2016) (determining that Miller does not apply to de facto life sentences
because Court in Miller did not explicitly hold that Eighth Amendment categori-
cally prohibits imposing sentence of LWOP on juvenile offenders).
117. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71 (explaining that retribution cannot serve as
legitimate penological justification for juveniles when retribution does not account
for diminished culpability, youth, and immaturity); see also id. at 571–72 (quoting
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)) (stating that deterrence can-
not serve as legitimate penological justification because it is unlikely that juveniles
will weigh risks of actions and attach weight to consequences of actions); Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–73 (2011) (asserting that incapacitation cannot serve as
legitimate penological justification because juvenile’s personality is transient and
amenable to rehabilitation, which signifies that most juveniles do not require life
incarceration); id. at 74 (stating that rehabilitation cannot serve as legitimate pe-
nological justification due to juvenile’s capacity for change and rehabilitation); cf.
Grant, 887 F.3d at 144 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472) (affirming what Court has
time and again reiterated: that absent penological justification, sentence is by na-
ture disproportionate to offense).
118. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 144.  The Grant court stated:
[N]one of what it said about children—about their distinctive (and tran-
sitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime -specific.
Those features are evident in the same way, and to the same degree,
when . . . a botched robbery turns into a killing.  So Graham’s reasoning
implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as
its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses.
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sion between LWOP, regardless of whether it is de facto or by name, and
rehabilitation because both sentences reject any hope of societal
reintegration.119
2. Merciful Sentencing: The Third Circuit’s Promise That De Facto LWOP
Sentences Per Se Violate Graham’s “Meaningful Opportunity to
Obtain Release”
After establishing that the mitigating factors accompanying youth rec-
ognized by the Miller Court and the inapplicability of penological justifica-
tions counsel against the imposition of LWOP sentences for juveniles, the
Third Circuit proceeded to hold that de facto LWOP sentences for corrigi-
ble juvenile offenders are per se unconstitutional.120  De facto LWOP
sentences cannot conceivably provide a meaningful opportunity for re-
lease because such extensive term-of-years sentences relegate juveniles to
spend the rest of their life behind bars.121  Much like a LWOP sentence by
name, de facto LWOP sentences are incompatible with Graham and
Miller.122  Both sentences strip corrigible juvenile offenders of the hope
that with rehabilitation and maturity, a parole board may one day allow
them to rejoin society.123  The crux of the problem then, as the Third
Circuit alluded, is interpreting the age at which a juvenile can still truly
achieve a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”124
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 473) (reasoning that hold-
ings of Graham and Miller should apply to both de jure and de facto LWOP
sentences).
119. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 144 (explaining that because juveniles have higher
propensity for rehabilitation, it is illogical to prevent them from demonstrating
this capacity for change and remorse to parole board by subjecting them to LWOP
sentence).
120. See id. (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 473) (declaring that due to lack of consti-
tutional justification underlying de facto LWOP sentences, such sentences are un-
constitutional under Eighth Amendment).
121. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (stating that LWOP is irreconcilable with
youth’s hopeful ability to change); see also Grant, 887 F.3d at 143–45 (concluding
that Court’s logic in Graham applies to de facto LWOP and LWOP sentences by
name because Graham mandates that incorrigible juvenile offenders must receive
meaningful opportunity for release).
122. See id. at 145 (arguing that de facto LWOP sentences fail to provide
juveniles with hope of meaningful opportunity for release); see also Wheelwright,
supra note 36, at 297 (suggesting that Missouri ought to abolish LWOP sentencing
scheme for juvenile offenders, to provide hope that they may one day live as free
individuals).
123. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 142 (justifying unconstitutionality of de facto
LWOP sentences); see also id. at 145–46 (citing Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184,
1191–92 (9th Cir. 2013) (asserting that de facto LWOP sentences clearly conflict
with Graham and federal law)).
124. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 146–47 (asserting that after having determined that
term-of-years sentence meets or exceeds juvenile offender’s life expectancy violates
Eighth Amendment, Third Circuit must determine what constitutes meaningful
opportunity for release); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text (interpret-
ing what Graham meant by meaningful opportunity for release, stating that even if
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B. The Third Circuit’s Promising Interpretation of
“Meaningful Opportunity for Release”
The Court in Graham stated that a “juvenile should not be deprived of
the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of
human worth and potential.”125  The Third Circuit interpreted this to
mean that the essence of a “meaningful opportunity for release” is rooted
in liberating offenders at a point in time when they may still find “fulfill-
ment outside prison walls,” “reconciliation with society,” and “hope.”126
Notably, a compassionate physical release from prison at a point shortly
before the offender’s death does not satisfy a meaningful opportunity for
release.127  The Third Circuit adopted a broad interpretation of what con-
stitutes a meaningful opportunity for release, because the government
standard applied in Grant’s case—“[a] hope for some years outside prison
walls”—was far too narrow.128
The Third Circuit adopted a sentencing framework that it believed
would better effectuate the Supreme Court’s holdings.129  This framework
required sentencing judges to conduct individualized evidentiary hearings
that calculate the offender’s life expectancy to avoid the risk that a term-
of-years sentence will meet or exceed that age.130  These sentencing
offenders’ parole eligibility dates are within their lifetime, if chance of release
comes near end of life, this likely would not meet Graham’s requirements).
125. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 147 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 79) (interpreting
significance of Graham’s meaningful opportunity for release); see also People v.
Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 455 (Cal. 2018) (including citations to state legislation
demonstrating leniency in juvenile sentencing landscape in light of Graham and
Miller).
126. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 79 (“Life in prison without the possibility of pa-
role gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconcilia-
tion with society, no hope.”); see also Grant, 887 F.3d at 147 (quoting Graham, 560
U.S. at 79) (reciting elements that Graham Court considers in determining what
meaningful opportunity for release denotes).  For a further discussion of inconsis-
tent applications of Graham’s meaningful opportunity for release, see supra notes
75–80, and accompanying text.
127. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 147 (stating that Graham’s meaningful opportunity
for release necessitates more than physical release shortly before death); see also
State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 205 (N.J. 2017) (appearing as amicus curiae, Seton
Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice advocated that New Jersey
court should adopt thirty-year-maximum period of parole ineligibility as uniform
rule for juvenile offenders because this would provide juvenile offenders genuine
hope to spend some years outside prison beyond geriatric release); id. at 216 n.4
(providing examples of how states have amended juvenile sentencing laws in wake
of Graham and Miller).
128. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 148 (arguing that New Jersey’s interpretation of
Graham does not alleviate grave effects of LWOP).
129. See id. (stating that Third Circuit elects to adopt legal framework that
effectuates Supreme Court precedent but attempts to go no further).
130. See id. at 149–50 (holding that sentencing judges must conduct individu-
alized evidentiary hearings to determine corrigible juvenile offender’s life expec-
tancy before sentencing individual to term-of-years sentence, to avoid sentencing
individual at or beyond their life expectancy).  The Grant Court explains that indi-
vidualized sentencing hearings “are already a familiar exercise for lower courts,
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judges must then fashion an appropriate term-of-years sentence that pro-
vides for a meaningful opportunity for release.131  Nevertheless, the first
part of this framework still begs the question: “at what age is one still able
to meaningfully reenter society after release from prison?”132
The Third Circuit reasoned that because society accepts the national
age of retirement, age sixty-five, as a transitional life stage, juveniles ought
to receive an opportunity of release prior to this age.133  The Third Circuit
determined that affording a juvenile offender an opportunity for parole
before the national age of retirement would provide these offenders with
the hope of reconciling with society and achieving hope outside prison—
fundamental aims of both Graham and Miller.134  Notwithstanding this
framework, the Third Circuit declined to draw a bright line at which a
juvenile offender can “meaningfully reenter society after release from
prison,” but acknowledged that the age of retirement marks “the simulta-
neous end of a career that contributed to society in some capacity and the
birth of an opportunity for the retiree to attend to other endeavors in
life.”135  Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that states ought to presump-
which routinely measure life expectancy in various tort, contract, and employment
disputes.” See id. (citing Anastasio v. Schering Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 709 (3d Cir.
1988)) (stating that in addition to actuarial tables, lower courts ought to consider
evidence that “bears on the offender’s mortality, such as medical examinations,
medical records, family medical history, and pertinent expert testimony.”). See gen-
erally United States v. Mathurin, 868 F.3d 921, 932–34 (11th Cir. 2017) (summariz-
ing effectiveness and drawbacks of using life expectancy tables in sentencing).
131. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 149–50 (discussing how Third Circuit intends to
measure life expectancy without violating offenders’ constitutional rights); see also
O’Toole v. United States, 242 F.2d 308, 309 (3d Cir. 1957) (declining to measure
life expectancy based solely on actuarial tables); cf. Mathurin, 868 F.3d at 932 (eval-
uating constitutional issues arising from reliance on actuarial life expectancy tables
in sentencing).
132. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 150 (reasoning that because society accepts na-
tional age of retirement as transitional life stage, that this age could be age at
which corrigible juvenile offender could rejoin society); see also Alison M. Smith,
Third Circuit Invalidates De Facto Life Sentences for “Non-Incorrigible” Juvenile Offenders,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1, 3 (2018) (stating that while Third Circuit resolved not to
establish bright-line rule regarding when juvenile offenders should become eligi-
ble for parole, it sought to establish national age of retirement as outer
parameter).
133. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 150 (citing Retirement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed., 2014)) (justifying how Third Circuit chose to draw line at national age
of retirement as transitional life stage).
134. See Megan McCabe Jarrett, Stifling a Shot at a Second Chance: Florida’s Re-
sponse to Graham and Miller and the Missed Opportunity for Change in Juvenile Sentenc-
ing, 45 STETSON L. REV. 499, 531 (2016) (promoting abolition of LWOP as
sentencing option to promote spirit of Graham and Miller, proffering juveniles with
meaningful chance of release).
135. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 150 (emphasizing why Third Circuit chooses to
mark Graham’s meaningful opportunity for release at national age of retirement).
Although the Third Circuit declines to draw a bright line at which lower courts
must offer juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity for release, it offers a rea-
soned explanation as to why the national age of retirement is a prudent choice. See
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tively sentence juveniles below the national age of retirement unless other
sentencing factors strongly advise against doing so.136
V. SUPREME COURT’S LACK OF JUVENILE PROTECTION
BEGETS LACK OF JUVENILE HOPE
Although the Supreme Court has made promising strides in protect-
ing one of the most vulnerable classes of offenders, until the Court ex-
pressly holds that juvenile de facto LWOP term-of-years sentences per se
violate the Eighth Amendment, state and federal courts must effectuate a
framework that absolutely prohibits de facto LWOP sentences for corrigi-
ble juvenile offenders.137 Graham and Miller read together afford all corri-
gible juvenile offenders the opportunity to demonstrate growth and
maturity and give such offenders hope of societal reintegration.138  Be-
cause it seems that certain state and federal courts intentionally circum-
vent Graham and Miller’s objectives by sentencing corrigible juveniles to de
facto LWOP sentences, there must be uniform protections in place to en-
id. (declaring that there is no “principled basis” as to what age to mark Graham’s
meaningful opportunity for release).
Is there a principled reason for why, say, a juvenile offender can properly
reenter society at age fifty but not age sixty?  At age sixty but not age
seventy?  We believe not. . . .  [W]e are not aware of any widely accepted
studies to support such precise line drawing on a principled basis in the
prison release context.
Id. (explaining reasoning behind marking national age of retirement as age at
which juvenile offenders may successfully reenter society).
136. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 149–51 (asserting that although juvenile offenders
should presumptively receive opportunity for release before national age of retire-
ment, this presumption is not “a hard and fast rule.”).  The Third Circuit held that
although it believed its rebuttable presumption was “necessary to give life to the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Graham and Miller,” it also wanted to reserve lower
courts discretion to “depart from it in the exceptional circumstances where a juve-
nile offender is found to be capable of reform but the § 3553(a) factors still favor a
sentence beyond the national age of retirement.” See id. at 152–53 (stating that
although there may be instances where 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors
favor sentencing juveniles beyond national age of retirement, such sentences will
be “rare and unusual” and still may not meet or exceed juvenile offender’s life
expectancy).
137. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2011) (stating that ultimate dis-
cretion is left with states in determining how its jurisdiction should comply with
Graham and Miller); cf. Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV.
1787, 1816–18 (2016) (evaluating different states’ responses to sentencing post-
Miller). See generally JOSHUA ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SLOW TO ACT:
STATE RESPONSES TO 2012 SUPREME COURT MANDATE ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE  2
(2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Slow-
to-Act-State-Responses-to-Miller.pdf [https://perma.cc/32MQ-24V5] (listing Ha-
waii, Massachusetts, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming as states that have abol-
ished juvenile LWOP post-Miller).
138. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 142 (asserting that de facto LWOP sentences vio-
late Graham and Miller’s objective of affording all corrigible juvenile offenders op-
portunity to obtain release based on rehabilitation and reform).
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sure that these term-of-years sentences do not intrude on a corrigible juve-
nile’s right of attaining a meaningful opportunity for release.139
A. How the Third Circuit Breaks its Promise of Protecting
Juvenile Offender Retirement
Because the Third Circuit’s rebuttable presumption permits sentenc-
ing judges to sentence corrigible juveniles beyond the national age of re-
tirement, this rebuttable presumption inherently denies corrigible
juveniles parole and infringes on Graham’s requirement affording all corri-
gible juveniles a meaningful opportunity for release.140  The Third Circuit
stated that it would not intrude on a district court’s discretion to impose
an appropriate term-of-years sentence on a corrigible juvenile if other sen-
tencing factors favored a lengthier sentence.141  The Third Circuit rea-
soned that Miller did not categorically eradicate LWOP sentences for
juvenile offenders.142  The Third Circuit’s inherent caution to abolish de
facto LWOP sentences for corrigible juvenile offenders, however, misap-
plies Miller’s fundamental holding—the Miller Court did in fact categori-
cally proscribe LWOP sentences for all corrigible juvenile offenders.143
Following Miller, lower courts do not possess the discretion to sentence any
corrigible juvenile to LWOP—these courts may only sentence perma-
nently incorrigible youths to such discretionary LWOP sentences.144
139. See Drinan, supra note 137, at 1831 (evaluating different procedural safe-
guards for children facing LWOP sentences).
140. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 152 (asserting that because sentencing judge is
more familiar with individual defendant and case, Third Circuit cannot categori-
cally prohibit sentencing judge from sentencing offender beyond national age of
retirement).
141. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 152–53 (maintaining that because Grant’s holding
establishes “only a rebuttable presumption that a non-incorrigible juvenile of-
fender should be afforded an opportunity for release before the national age of
retirement,” lower courts retain discretion to fashion term-of-years sentences be-
yond national age of retirement for corrigible offenders if other sentencing fac-
tors, such as juvenile’s background and upbringing, favor such lengthier
sentence).
142. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 152 (asserting limits on rebuttable presumption of
not sentencing juvenile offender to punishment extending beyond national age of
retirement).
143. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 724 (2016) (declaring that
Miller prohibited LWOP sentences for corrigible juvenile offenders); see also
United States v. Sheppard, No. 96-00085-04-CR-W-FJG, 2017 WL 875484, at *4
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 3, 2017) (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 724)) (reasoning that
because Miller forecloses juvenile life sentences for corrigible offenders, Missouri
court must resentence Sheppard to more lenient sentence that is more representa-
tive of his capability of reform).
144. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 724 (declaring that, after Miller, sentencing
judges may only sentence permanently incorrigible juvenile offenders to life
sentences); see also Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 708 (Md. 2018) (illustrating that
Miller and Montgomery stand for proposition that sentencing courts may only sen-
tence incorrigible juvenile homicide offenders to LWOP, de facto or otherwise);
Anna K. Christensen, Rehabilitating Juvenile Life Without Parole, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR.
132, 137–40 (2013) (arguing that given Miller’s restriction of only sentencing rare
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Further, the Third Circuit’s decision to employ retirement age as
merely a sentencing factor is ineffective because lower court sentencing
judges may disregard this sentencing factor and continue to relegate
juveniles to death by LWOP.145  These judges may justify such lengthy
sentences by broadly stating that other sentencing factors, such as charac-
teristics in the youth’s past, simply outweigh sentencing the juvenile below
the national age of retirement.146  There is little, if any, value in the Third
Circuit defining Graham’s meaningful opportunity to obtain release at an
age at or near retirement if a sentencing judge can seemingly disregard
it.147
Moreover, although the burden is on the government to demonstrate
that a sentencing judge should sentence a juvenile above the national age
of retirement, it is clear that sentencing judges within different states and
federal courts already utilize their discretion inconsistently, if not arbitrar-
ily.148  Although the Supreme Court has rallied against imprisoning corri-
gible juveniles for life, some judges unremittingly continue to impose de
facto life sentences upon such corrigible juveniles in disregard of Graham
and Miller.149  If the Third Circuit truly wishes to protect its youth, it must
adopt a stronger check than a rebuttable presumption.150
incorrigible juvenile offenders to LWOP sentences, Supreme Court should have
gone further to provide automatic parole eligibility for all corrigible juvenile
offenders).
145. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 135 (acknowledging that even after district court
resentenced Grant, considering his mitigating factors of youth, he still received
sixty-five-year sentence); cf. Carter, 192 A.3d at 721–22 (examining Maryland’s pa-
role statute and concluding that because the statute did not prohibit de facto life
sentences for corrigible juvenile offenders, it was in violation of Graham and Miller
protections).
146. For a discussion of states and federal courts utilizing inconsistent juve-
nile sentencing schemes in analyzing Graham and Miller objectives, see supra notes
75–80 and accompanying text.
147. See generally Criminal Law—Sentencing—Colorado Supreme Court Holds that
Aggregate Term of Years Sentences Can Never Implicate Eighth Amendment Restrictions on
Juvenile Life Without Parole, Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, 394 P.3d 1128, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 1187, 1190 (2018) (commenting that Lucero court read Graham and Miller
far too narrowly, in seeming disregard of Supreme Court’s discussion of special
characteristics of juveniles and how this suggests imposing LWOP sentences with
extreme rarity).
148. For a discussion of the inconsistencies in applying the Graham Court’s
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” see supra notes 75–80 and accompany-
ing text.
149. See Elizabeth C. Kingston, Validating Montgomery’s Recharacterization of
Miller: An End to LWOP for Juveniles, 38 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 23, 50–52 (2016)
(providing breakdown of states that continually impose LWOP and states that have
categorically banned such punishments).
150. See generally People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 455 (Cal. 2018) (provid-
ing examples of state legislation passed in wake of Graham and Miller that ostensi-
bly account for meaningful opportunity for release).
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B. How the Third Circuit May Offer Juvenile Offenders
a Hopeful Retirement from Prison
To preserve juvenile rights under Graham and Miller, the Third Circuit
ought to be a pioneer and guarantee automatic parole hearings for all
corrigible juvenile offenders at or before the national age of retire-
ment.151  Automatic parole eligibility ensures that corrigible juveniles are
not deprived of a chance to demonstrate rehabilitation to a parole
board—this approach seeks to balance retribution for the offense with a
juvenile’s inherent diminished culpability.152  The essential hope is that if
juveniles know, without a doubt, that they will become eligible for parole,
this hope will incentivize them to work towards rehabilitation.153
In the post-Miller era, just as all juvenile offenders possess the constitu-
tional right of individualized sentencing hearings to demonstrate corrigi-
bility, all corrigible juvenile offenders must also possess the automatic
right to parole at a meaningful age in advocating for their release.154  If a
corrigible juvenile offender has no opportunity to demonstrate reforma-
tion and remorse, due to a de facto LWOP sentence, then categorizing the
juvenile as corrigible is inherently meaningless.155  To retain Miller’s sig-
nificance, courts should eliminate any possibility that a state or federal
court may mandatorily incarcerate a rehabilitated juvenile for life.156
Automatic parole eligibility by no means guarantees a juvenile of-
fender’s release from prison.157  A neutral parole board still safeguards
151. See Singer, supra note 29, at 696 (suggesting that solution to juvenile sen-
tencing post-Montgomery is to automatically make juvenile eligible for parole after
serving mandatory minimum sentences).
152. See Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 150 (3d Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, vacated,
905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018) (case listed for rehearing en banc Feb. 20, 2019)
(explaining that while there is no bright line age at which juveniles are no longer
able to reintegrate into society, Third Circuit accepts national age of retirement as
transitional life stage where person still has opportunity to engage in substantial
life endeavors).
153. See Ashley Nellis, Tinkering with Life: A Look at the Inappropriateness of Life
Without Parole As an Alternative to the Death Penalty, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 439, 457
(2013) (theorizing that LWOP is equivalent to death sentence—both foreclose any
possibility of redemption or reform despite fact that many juvenile offenders are in
fact corrigible and are able to live productive law-abiding lives).
154. See, e.g., Kelly Scavone, How Long is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to
De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439, 3474 (2014) (advocating for affording juveniles with
multiple opportunities for release at staggered points throughout sentence to rec-
oncile Graham and Miller’s mandate of meaningful opportunity for release and
lengthy term-of-year sentences).
155. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 143 (asserting that sentence treating corrigible ju-
venile offender as incorrigible makes little sense in light of Miller).
156. See Kingston, supra note 149, at 52–57 (commenting on Montgomery
Court’s expansion on Miller analysis, and discussing Miller’s categorical prohibition
of life sentences, LWOP and de facto, for corrigible juvenile offenders).
157. See Lauren Kinell, Answering the Unanswered Questions: How States Can Com-
port with Miller v. Alabama, 13 CON. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 164 (2013) (affirming that
comporting with Graham and Miller’s holdings does not automatically guarantee
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against the release of juvenile offenders who have not been rehabili-
tated.158  Granting automatic parole at this age, however, reflects funda-
mental principles upon which the juvenile justice system was founded:
rehabilitation and diminished culpability.159
As the Supreme Court rationalized time and again, there is an in-
creasingly fervent movement towards protecting juveniles from the perils
of adult sentencing.160  Many states passed LWOP sentencing schemes as a
result of the fictitious “super-predator” scare, demonstrating the unreason-
ableness of punitive LWOP sentencing.161  Thus, the Third Circuit ought
to proffer juvenile offenders automatic parole at or before the national
age of retirement because there is nothing worse than depriving a child of
hope, for such deprivation is practically analogous to capital
punishment.162
release because offenders must still convince parole board that they no longer
pose danger to public).
158. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010) (assuring that parole board
ensures against release of non-rehabilitated juveniles); see also Wheelwright, supra
note 36, at 268 (declaring that hope is part of Eight Amendment jurisprudence for
juvenile sentencing).
159. See Singer, supra note 29, at 737–38 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16
(1967)) (arguing that releasing juveniles after having served minimum sentence
would comport with rehabilitation, fundamental goal of juvenile justice system).
160. For a further discussion of the rapidly changing landscape of juvenile
sentencing, see supra notes 37–81 and accompanying text.
161. For a further discussion of Professor Dilulio’s “super-predator” era, see
supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Singer, supra note 29, at 737–38
(recognizing that LWOP sentences increased during “super-predator” scare).
162. See Feld, A Slower Form of Death, supra note 46, at 48–49 (arguing that
courts should apply justifications used to prohibit juvenile capital punishment to
limit LWOP sentences because both punishments deprive juveniles of life).
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